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The principle of rule of law is not only a normative but also a legal cultural concept1, so 
understanding it more or less requires a return to our legal cultural roots. This article offers a 
glimpse at a Nordic way of understanding the concept of rule of law.  I am merely scratching the 
surface of the Nordic legal thinking, since the Nordic legal literature is influenced by various 
conceptions of the multidimensional concept of rule of law, which are not all mentioned or 
analysed in this article. For example, I have intentionally omitted the Nordic discussion concerning 
the question, how one should understand rule of law in the framework of Nordic welfare state.2 
The emphasis is on the Finnish sources, which may at least to a certain extent illustrate the Nordic 
legal systems in general.  
 
In Finland the interpretation of the rule of law principle has been characterized by the comparison 
especially to the Anglo-American concept of Rule of Law and the German Rechtsstaat concept.3  At 
                                                     
1 See Tuori, Kaarlo: Oikeuden ratio ja voluntas, WSOYpro, Helsinki, 2007, p. 222, (Tuori 2007) and Tuori, Kaarlo: Ratio 
and Voluntas, Ashgate, 2011, p. 208, (Tuori 2011). Tuori has somewhat similarly separated the Constitution into 
explicit, written norms and constitutional culture, which refers to constitutional theories, concepts and principles, as 
well as ways of dealing with these, i.e. patterns of constitutional argumentation.  Kaarlo Tuori is the still active and 
influential Emeritus Professor of Legal Theory at Helsinki University.  
2 See about the rule of law and welfare state e.g. Tuori, Kaarlo: Oikeus, valta ja demokratia, Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 
Helsinki, 1990, Dalberg-Larsen, Jorgen: Retstaten, velfaerdstaten og hvad så ?, Kobenhavn 1984, or Asmussen, Ida 
Helene: Fra Retstat til Omsorgsstat,  DjØf Forlag, Kobenhavn, 2014.This discussion was especially topical in the 1970s 
and 1980s in Nordic countries. However, it seems to be topical in the context of contemporary EU law, which can be 
illustrated by referring to Trstenjak, Verica: The Welfare State in Times of Crisis: Threat to the Rule of Law?, in 
Ilopoulos-Strangas, Julia (ed.): Die Zukunft des Sozialen Rechtsstaates in Europa, Nomos, 2015, s. 299-306. 
3 See, for example, Jyränki, Antero: Presidentti, Tutkimus valtionpäämiehen asemasta Suomessa v. 1919-1976, 
Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, A-sarja No 123, Vammala, 1978, pp. 41-42, Tuori, Kaarlo: 
Oikeusvaltiokäsite – vielä kerran, teoksessa Foucault’n oikeus, Kirjoituksia oikeudesta ja sen tutkimisesta, WSOY, 
Vantaa, 2002, pp. 49-65, (Tuori 2002), Raitio, Juha: The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, Kluwer Academic 
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times, also the ideals of the French Revolution, Montesquieu’s separation of powers principle and 
the principle of legality have been referred to when giving background to the principle of rule of 
law.4 Recently, the principle of rule of law has also been considered from the global trade and 
comparative law viewpoint.5 Yet, there is still reason to study the rule  of law from a Nordic point 
of view, since I argue that it contains a material element. This is a controversial statement even in 
Nordic countries, since academic debate has risen on to what extent the concept of rule of law can 
be interpreted as having a certain kind of material content.   
 
Indeed, the bone of contention in academic discussion still seems to be the question of the 
relationship between democracy and the rule of law. Can the rule of law exist, for example, if the 
only requirement for the rule of law is a stable market and predictable norms in a society, 
whereupon it does not matter how the norms have originated and what their content is? 
Discussion on the rule of law is a cultural issue. With regard to the Western concept of rule of law, 
like Jyränki I believe it is essential to emphasize that the fields of application for the democracy 
principle and the principle of rule of law “overlap”, i.e. merge in certain sections, even though the 
concepts carry a different meaning.6 In addition to the question of the material content, the 
question is also to what extent the concept of rule of law is examined as a supranational legal 
cultural concept from the viewpoint of comparative law, and to what extent we want to give 
weight to the EU legal concept of rule of law on the national level. The aim is to analyse these 
topical questions with regard to the European Union from a Nordic viewpoint. This is relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Publishers: Dordrecht, 2003, pp.  134-146, (Raitio 2003) and Tuori 2007, pp. 221-247. Antero Jyränki is Emeritus 
Professor of Constitutional law at Turku University.  
4 See, for example, Jyränki, Antero: Oikeusvaltio ja demokratia, in Aulis Aarnio and Timo Uusitupa (eds.).: Oikeusvaltio, 
Lakimiesliiton kustannus, Helsinki, 2002, pp. 13-26, (Jyränki 2002). According to him, French physiocrats, for example, 
strived for the rule of law in the 1700s, already before the French Revolution. Famously, Montesquieu in his work 
’Esprit des Lois’ (The Spirit of Laws, 1748) laid a basis for the development of the rule of law, especially with the 
elevation of the principle of legality. The idea of the rule of law was a reaction to an arbitrary and unanticipated 
administration and application of law.  
5 See Husa, Jaakko: Nordic Law and Development – See No Evil, Hear No Evil?, Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 60, 
2015, (Husa 2015), pp. 1-16. Jaakko Husa is currently Professor of Legal Culture and Legal Linguistics at Lapland 
University. 
6 See Jyränki 2002, pp. 24-25. For example, Jyränki mentions the use of an Act of Parliament, which is related to 
democracy as part of the democratic legitimation chain of the exercise of power and to the rule of law as a basic 
requirement for restricting individual freedom. 
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bearing in mind the various tensions especially between the European Union and Poland, which are 
at least partly connected to the way of understanding the meaning of the rule of law concept.7  
 
 
1.  Does the concept of rule of law have any material content in the Nordic countries? 
 
Based on legal literature, the content of the concept of rule of law seems to be contested, 
especially with regard to how the material dimension of the concept of rule of law should be 
regarded. In Sweden, Frändberg has described the concept of rule of law as a “rhetorical balloon” 
that one can, in a way, fill up, including in it everything possible that is felt to be positive.8 In 
Finland in turn, Tuori has utilized this Frändberg term in different contexts and warned about a 
conceptual idyll, in which the concept of rule of law contains mutually conflicting principles.9 This 
observation assumes significance, for example, by referring to the German Third Reich's “National 
Socialist rule of law”, in which the concept of rule of law was given material and political content 
in a way that is far from the democratic rule of law ideal.10  
 
According to my interpretation, in his works Tuori has strived to avoid defining material content 
for the concept of rule of law. An example of this is Tuori’s recently presented definition of the 
concept of rule of law in the European Union context, in which he emphasizes protecting the 
powers of the Member States, the principle of legality and accountability, i.e. the responsibility for 
and controllability of the exercise of power.11 Instead, the democratic rule of law outlined at the 
time for a nation state context seems for him to be the concept pair that ensures individual legal 
protection and ensures the material competence of law through human and fundamental rights. 
 
                                                     
7 See  e.g. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland, OJ, No L 
217, 12.8.2016, pp. 53-68, (C/2016/5703) or  
8 See Frändberg, Åke: Begreppet rättsstat, in Sterzel, Fredrik (ed.): Rättsstaten – rätt, politik, moral, Göteborg, 1996, 
1996, pp. 21-41, more closely pp. 22-23, (Frändberg 1996). Åke Frändberg is Emeritus Professor of Jurisprudence at 
Uppsala University. 
9 See, for example, Tuori 2002, p. 49 and Tuori 2007, p. 225. 
10 See Tuori 2007, pp. 177-178. Concepts used in constitutional law are time-bound, and Tuori has illustrated this aptly 
by referring to Carl Schmitt's sociology of concepts. 
11 See Tuori, Kaarlo: European Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 214, (Tuori 2015), 
in which these three normative elements are ”protection of Member State powers, the principle of legality and 
accountability”. For these, Articles 5(2) and 13(2) TEU can be referred to. 
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On the other hand, at least in Finland, the concept of rule of law has been presented as also 
having material content. For example, in 2002, Jyränki presented a very clear analysis of the 
historical layers of the Finnish concept of rule of law as follows: 
 
1. Public power must be based on law 
2. The state is organized by the constitution, to which the entire legal order is returned 
3. Individual rights and obligations may be provided for by decisions of only such a body, 
whose designation everyone can have an equal effect on, in other words, with an Act of 
Parliament 
4. Law is applied to an individual case by independent authorities organized into courts for 
the purpose of giving legal protection. Everyone is guaranteed access to a court with 
regard to their own affairs.  
5. Basic and Fundamental rights that are binding on all public activities protect the 
individual’s position.  
 
With regard to this division, Jyränki has stated that layers 1-4 are elements of a formal concept of 
rule of law, whereas layer 5 refers to a material concept of rule of law.  However, he notes that 
loading the concept of rule of law with formal and material elements takes away from its 
distinctiveness, but sees it nevertheless necessary bearing in mind the prevailing use of language.  
 
It is notable that Jyränki does not mention the democratic rule of law at all in this context.12 
Instead, he leads us to the interpretation of the Finnish concept of rule of law through the Anglo-
American concept of rule of law, which, as the common law legal culture, is characterized by the 
fact that as many societal conflicts as possible can be converted into the form of a court case, 
and that the law is not perceived primarily as a positive right set by a democratic legislator in a 
continental European sense.13 Indeed, in this view, it is essential to separate the Rechtsstaat 
discourse intertwined with the German legal culture14 from the Anglo-American rule of law 
                                                     
12 See Jyränki 2002, pp. 23-24. 
13 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
14 See, for example, Tuori, Kaarlo: Four Models of Rechtsstaat, in W. Krawietz and G. Henrik von Wright (eds.): 
Öffentliche oder Private Moral, Festschift für Ernesto Garzón Valdes, Duncker & Humbold, 1992, p. 451 and Fernandez 
Esteban, Maria Luisa: The Rule of Law in the European Constitution, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999, p. 82, 
(Fernandez Esteban 1999). Tuori has divided the development of the Rechtsstaat concept into four phases, which 
Fernandez Esteban describes with the terms ”liberal, formal, substantial and democratic”. 
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discourse. On the one hand, the Anglo-American concept of rule of law, and on the other hand the 
increasing importance of fundamental rights and different legal principles in judicial procedures 
has created discussion on a State ruled by the Judges and often in a very negative tone. At the 
same time, we have been able to establish that legal principles are taking an increasing share from 
rules in the entity of the legal system, which, for its part, has been seen to be a symptom of the 
strengthening of the application of law and the science of law in relation to legislation.15 
 
In recent years, Hallberg has brought new content to the definition of the concept of rule of law, 
which cannot be derived from German legal science in the way, for example, the concept of the 
democratic rule of law can.  Hallberg's understanding of the rule of law is dynamic and quite 
international with regard to its emphases in the sense that he builds his concept of rule of law 
from the local level to the international level and from there onwards taking into account regional 
integration and finally globalization. In addition, the citizen's viewpoint and along with it e.g. the 
emphasis on fundamental and human rights are characteristics of a dynamic and wide-ranging 
concept of rule of law. In his interpretation of the rule of law, Hallberg refers to the interaction 
between public administration and civil society, whereupon a discussion on the functionality of 
social order and citizens’ experiences of the realization of justice can be included in the rule of law 
discourse. He does not emphasize the differences between the Anglo-American concept of rule of 
law and the German Rechtsstaat concept, but rather looks for their shared features to form a kind 
of a synthesis of the modern principle of rule of law in such a way that legality and legitimacy both 
receive their share in the content of the concept of rule of law.16 To be exact, Hallberg, according 
to his own words, has not studied the rule of law as a concept but rather a kind of a development 
process.17 And indeed, nowadays in legal studies one tends to study processes such as 
constitutionalization, Europeanization or globalization. 
 
Hallberg sees that the concept of rule of law has three stages of development. He, also, 
intertwines the development at the early stage with the fairly formal interpretation of the 
                                                     
15 See Tuori 2007, pp. 249-275. The threat that politically natured powers are transferred to courts, even though in a 
democratic rule of law they should belong to the Parliament and the government that controls its work and to which it 
is accountable, is related to juridification. 
16 See Hallberg, Pekka: The Rule of Law, Edita, Helsinki, 2004, pp. 5-6 and 11-70, (Hallberg 2004). Pekka Hallberg is the 
former president of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court and the Rule of law has been his main research topic 
for years. 
17 The interpretation is based on my discussion with Hallberg at the launch of the book ”Rule of Law and Sustainable 
Development” on 25 April 2017 at the University of Helsinki. 
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“classic” concept of rule of law that emphasizes the principle of legality. He considers the 
democratic rule of law as the next stage and as the third stage, the concept of rule of law in social 
dimensions.18 He emphasizes that one should not adhere to an examination that is too normative 
when defining the concept of rule of law but rather it is important in the interpretation to take 
into account the empirical evidence related to the content of the concept of rule of law.19 This 
dynamic concept of rule of law can be fleshed out to consist of the following four factors: 
 
1. principle of legality 
2. the balanced separation of powers 
3. fundamental and human rights 
4. Rule of law as a functional entity (functionality)20 
 
His interpretation of the concept of rule of law is thus quite broad. He sees that the concept of 
rule of law is based on a legal context characteristic of each time and place, and that it is 
discretionary with regard to its content.21 For that reason, he analyzes the concept of rule of law 
from many different viewpoints, taking into consideration both national and international 
influences. Hallberg’s interpretation of the concept of rule of law is thus based on a completely 
different discourse than, for example, Frändberg’s.22  
 
In Hallberg's interpretation, I think it is quite essential to emphasize its global nature, which 
becomes apparent especially in contexts concerning the functionality of the rule of law. In the 
interpretation of modern law, one must take into account the relativized sovereignty of states, 
which he describes as a transition from political constitutionalism to economic constitutionalism.23 
                                                     
18 See Hallberg 2004, p. 14, where it is stated that the third stage of the concept of rule of law is a kind of social capital 
as follows: “In the conclusions of this study, the focus is on the issues concerning the legitimacy of the use of power, 
the identity of the people and the value judgments of civil society, essentially part of the third layer of rule of law 
development. The study attempts at outlining a functional model of the rule of law, which can be conceived of a social 
capital.” 
19 Ibid., 41. 
20 Ibid, p. 6, 57 and 70-90 as well as Hallberg, Pekka: Rule of Law, Prospects in Central Asia Rural Areas and Human 
Problems, Edita, Keuruu, 2016, pp. 136-145, (Hallberg 2016). The capacity of the rule of law to operate is related e.g. 
to obligations to ensure the realization of fundamental and human rights and enable citizens to access their rights 
without unnecessary delay. 
21 See Hallberg 2004, pp. 33-34. 
22 See Frändberg 1996, pp. 22-23. Hallberg’s interpretation of the concept of rule of law that emphasizes discretion is 
in clear conflict with Frändberg’s quite formal and “neutral” interpretation. 
23 See Hallberg 2004, p. 190.   
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As the role of states has changed along with globalization, according to Hallberg it cannot avoid 
impacting administrative structures and practices of nation-states and the functioning of the 
judiciary. At the same time, the impact also extends to the concept of rule of law in such a way 
that it receives substantive content especially through fundamental and human rights. In this 
context, privatization of traditional tasks belonging to the state can be seen as a threat to the 
state’s legitimacy, if the principles of good governance and the legal protection of individuals 
suffer at the same time.24 Recently, Judt, has also criticized the same problem of the weakening 
state and strengthening markets. According to him, the reality of post-communism created a 
breeding ground for a fairly weak state, on the one hand in the United States during the reign of 
the Republicans, and on the other hand in Eastern Europe, where the “minimal state” of the fairly 
neoliberal economy replaced the strong state.25 
 
Examples taken from Jyränki’s and Hallberg's works cannot fully answer the question of whether 
some material content is related to the concept of rule of law specifically in the Nordic countries. 
This cursory and superficial examination suffices, however, to indicate that academic research 
concerning the concept of rule of law is out of step specifically with regard to what factors the 
concept of rule of law can be seen to include. It also seems that how the premises are chosen is 
central with regard to the interpretation of the concept of rule of law. For example, if the concept 
of rule of law is derived from German legal science26 and especially Habermas's legal theory, the 
emphasis on a democratic rule of law is justified as a conclusion.  
 
On the other hand, if the premise is to remove the concept of rule of law from its German history 
and connect it to the topical and global development of the rule of law, as Hallberg does, the 
concept of rule of law will unavoidably have a fairly multidimensional meaning, which also 
includes material elements. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that also Nieminen in 
her study on Europeanized constitutional law defines the modern concept of rule of law in such a 
way that it includes both the formal and material side. With the material or substantive side she 
above all refers to the requirement of the realization of justice. According to her, we seek justice 
                                                     
24 Ibid., pp. 195-197 and Tuori 2002. S. 62. Tuori has considered privatization and handing over of public tasks to be 
managed by market mechanisms as a threat to the rule of law.   
25 See Judt, Tony: Huonosti käy maan (Ill fares the land), Like, Keuruu, 2011, p. 218, (Judt 2011). Belief in the self-
direction of markets characterized especially the 1990s in Eastern Europe.  
26 See, for example, Tuori 2007, p. 185. 
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by having all of the state bodies separate from each other, exemplifying the separation of powers, 
and thus bound to ensure the material fundamental rights of citizens.27 
 
I think, however, that a very broad and in a way “global” concept of rule of law is open to criticism 
on several grounds. To wit, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of fundamental and 
human rights, I am worried if, for example, only the general order and predictable activity of the 
market can be interpreted as the content of the concept of rule of law and the legitimacy of the 
political system.28 Economy and law are so intertwined in the global economy that there are no 
universal values behind the concept of rule of law.  
 
Husa has illustrated how the principle of rule of law has been utilized in various development 
projects as a kind of Western export and often finally with fairly poor results.  We have been able 
to commit to projects supporting the rule of law to ensure that we can achieve a ”secure and 
stable investment climate”.29 Problems have resulted from the fact that Western industrial 
countries have not sufficiently understood the creation of the concept of rule of law from the legal 
cultural level.30  
 
For example, China’s understanding of rule of law creates an interesting tension in relation to how 
the principle of rule of law is perceived in Western countries.31 In China, the law is rather a way to 
use power (”rule by law” or ”governance with law as an instrument of ruling”) than a principle 
limiting the exercise of power and a basis for the legitimacy of power.32 This concept of rule by law 
                                                     
27 See Nieminen, Liisa: Eurooppalaistuva valtiosääntöoikeus – valtiosääntöistyvä Eurooppa, Suomalaisen 
lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, A-sarja No 259, Helsinki, 2004, p. 107, (Nieminen 2004). Dr. Nieminen is a prominent 
Finnish expert in Constitutional and Medical Law.  
28 See Judt 2011, p. 219, where Judt emphasizes that a stable authoritarian system is much more desirable for most of 
its citizens than a failed democratic state. This kind of thinking is quite far from the ideals exemplified by the 
democratic concept of rule of law. 
29 See Husa 2015, p. 8. 
30 Ibid, p. 15.  
31 On China's concept of rule of law, see more specifically Hallberg, Pekka: Rule of Law and Sustainable Development, 
Tallinn, 2017, pp. 62-85, (Hallberg 2017). China’s concept of rule of law must be seen in its own cultural context. 
Hallberg describes the Chinese legal culture as follows on page 63: ”Old traditions still have considerable significance 
in the present legal system of China. To put it briefly, the dominant factor influencing legal thinking is the hierarchical, 
communal and, hence, family-oriented nature of the system. With respect to politics, it should be noted that the centre 
of power has been viewed as an integral entity until these days. Consequently, there has been no separation of 
governance and jurisdiction or legal profession outside the official machinery”. 
32 See Husa 2015, pp. 12-13. Husa describes the central importance of a (virtuous) leader in legitimizing Chinese 
exercise of power. One can be virtuous in many different ways, i.e. the yardsticks for virtuousness can be related to 
religion or to how China's Communist Party defines virtuousness. 
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is in clear conflict with the Nordic as well as the European concept of rule of law. To be sure, one 
must remember that the Eastern European countries’ rule by law system did not collapse until the 
1990s, although it currently seems like especially Poland and Hungary have partially returned to 
the old authoritarian administrative culture.33 During the communist administration, courts were 
not independent of political exercise of power in the way required by the current European 
concept of rule of law.34 Consequently, the concept of rule of law next requires a brief overview of 
at least the German Rechtsstaat concept and the Anglo-American concept of rule of law.   
 
1.3. Rechtsstaat and the rule of law 
 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) way of perceiving the relationship between the state and law has at 
least to some extent been seen as the precursor to theories of rule of law. It has been accepted 
that Kant's categorical imperative included the idea of the general applicability of norms, as in the 
Rechtsstaat concept, so that they would be equitable at the same time.35 Kant's categorical 
imperative is based on a deontological concept of morality. Referring to Minkkinen, categorical 
imperative can be illustrated as follows: ”So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at 
the same time as a principle establishing universal law”.36 This principle is imperative because it 
obligates and categorical because it does not include any kind of reservation, i.e. it is absolute and 
unconditional.37 Therefore, we could hope that a universal law is behind a morally acceptable act 
                                                     
33 In Poland, the Law and Justice party has enacted legislative changes that questioned the independence of Poland's 
Constitutional Court. For this reason, the EU introduced the procedure under Article 7 TEU, on which see the 
commission's recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, delivered on July 27, 2016, on adhering to the principle of rule of law 
in Poland, EUVL, No L 217,12 August 2016, p. 53-68, (C/2016/5703. In Hungary, for its part, the government led by the 
Fidesz party caused a stir in spring 2017 by deciding to close down a central university (CEU, Central European 
University) independent of the political exercise of power through a new Universities Act. In addition, the government 
of Hungary has already for years weakened the independence of the Constitutional Court and the freedom of the 
media and the freedom of the civil society. 
34 On Rule by law thought in Eastern Europe see Sájo, András: Rule by Law in East Central Europe, in Gessner, Volkmar 
– Hoeland, Armin – Varga, Csaba (eds.): European Legal Cultures, Darthmouth, Aldershot, 1996, pp. 471-473, in which 
the relationship between law and the state is described as follows: “Under socialism, the role of law was understood in 
its relation to the state. Its purpose was to discipline people and create some kind of bureaucratic consistency in the 
administration of state affairs. Contrary to Weber’s bureaucratic law model, this legal system was not predictable; 
bureaucratic discipline and the rules of jurisdiction served the irrational or only the Party-dictated politically rational 
decisions at the moment”. 
35 See, for example, Fernandez Esteban 1999, p. 81.  
36 See Minkkinen, Panu: Järjen lait, Tutkijaliitto, Helsinki, 2002, p. 48 and 62, (Minkkinen 2002). On Kant’s philosophy, 
in addition to Minkkinen's work, see more specifically, for example, Saarinen, Esa: Länsimaisen filosofian historia 
huipulta huipulle Sokrateesta Marxiin, yhdeksäs painos, WSOY, Helsinki, 2001, pp. 227-254 (Saarinen 2001). 
Minkkinen is currently Professor of Legal Theory at Helsinki University. 
37 See Saarinen 2001, p. 247. 
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and a moral must be adhered to because of itself. According to Kant’s view, the law applies to 
activities, in which the act can impact another’s ability to act according to his own will.38 In law, 
the will is therefore in opposition to another will. Thus, the law does not, for example, regulate 
mercy.39 I find it problematic that the unconditional and strict validity of the categorical imperative 
remains no matter its consequences in a given situation. At worst, this may open up a possibility of 
quite a formal legalism that does not take consequences into account.  
 
Kant's moral philosophy was reflected in his political thought in such a way that he required equal 
treatment of all citizens and respect for individual freedoms. With regard to systems of 
government, he favored constitutional republicanism and saw that the central task of the state is 
maintaining order. For Kant, laws reflected the will of the entire community of law, and they were 
to be enacted in a democratic procedure that guaranteed the rationality of laws.40 In the 1700s, in 
addition to Kantian philosophy, concrete reforms, such as the codification of the civil code in 1751 
and progress in the supervision of public administration had an impact on the formation of the 
German Rechtsstaat concept.41  
 
In his works, Tuori has described the development of the concept of rule of law in Germany in 
detail.42 He describes how the early constitutional school of thought during autocracy pondered 
the relationship between a sovereign monarch and the law and required that the state implement 
its goals only within the limits of the law and by means of law. The law was seen as an ethical 
order, independent of the state and sovereignty. This ethical order also justified the inviolable 
rights belonging to citizens, which were primarily miscellaneous rights to freedom. The task of the 
rule of law was to ensure this sphere of freedom belonging to individuals. Germany’s early 
constitutional school of thought of the 1800s broke off the connection between democracy and 
the rule of law and favored a kind of constitutional monarchy, at the same time distancing itself 
from the principle of the sovereignty of the people during the Enlightenment and through its 
idealism from Kantianism. A democratic generation of laws was no longer seen as a guarantee for 
the realization of substantive requirements focused on laws.  
                                                     
38 See Minkkinen 2002, p. 62 and Klami, Hannu Tapani: Sanningen om rätten, Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, 1990, s. 106. 
39 See Minkkinen 2002, p. 62. 
40 See Tuori 2002, p. 58. 
41 See Fernandez Esteban 1999, p. 82. 
42 See Tuori 2002, pp. 49-65. 
 11 
 
According to Tuori, the next development phase of the Rechtsstaat concept began from the 
constitutional provision for a unified Germany in 1871, and it has been called the late 
constitutional phase. The state was no longer an ethical organism personified by a monarch, but 
rather the state was a community of will equivalent to legal entities under civil law, whose feature 
was sovereignty. At the same time, ethical principles lost their position as limits of the sovereign 
exercise of power, because the law was equated with a positive law provided by public bodies. 
Equating the law with legal positivist regulations meant a fairly formal concept of rule of law, from 
which substantive requirements concerning state activities could no longer be derived. The formal 
and material side was separated in the law in such a way that laws in the material sense could be 
introduced only with a formal law or based on the specific mandate of a formal law, which defines 
the relationship between the legislator and the executive powers.43 At the same time, the 
legislative powers were seen to be higher in the hierarchy than the executive and judicial powers. 
In this context, the study of the exercise of power by a sound administration gained major 
importance in German legal science in the 1800s.44  
 
Since then, the National Socialist legal ideology described the National Socialist rule of law as a 
state based on justice in a way which distanced itself far from the legal positivist ideals that the 
late constitutional school of thought had represented.45 As a matter of fact, my interpretation is 
that Nazi Germany’s legal system cannot be considered a rule of law at all, but rather it could 
perhaps be described as a kind of version of the rule by law system. It is also a distorted image of 
the law from the viewpoint of legal positivism. The National Socialist law was penetrated by 
ideology, and laws were interpreted in accordance with their spirit, i.e. from the values of the 
Nazis. In National Socialism, the sovereign dictator (Führer) received his task from the people and 
then interpreted the will of the people through a kind of existential connection between him and 
the people.46 The border between law and politics was blurred, for example, in such a way that 
the Nazi regime founded the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) in 1934 to handle political crimes as 
                                                     
43 Ibid., pp. 59-60. All expressions of intention by the state, which had been discussed and published in accordance 
with the procedural provisions of the Constitution were laws in a formal sense. 
44 Ibid, p. 55 and Fernandez Esteban 1999, p. 82.  Tuori refers to Thoma's studies on the administration’s conformity to 
law, but like Fernandez Esteban, of the researchers in the 1800s, in addition to Thoma, we can mention Mohl, Stahl, 
Gneist, Gerber, Mayer, Laband, Anschuztz and Jellinek. 
45 See Tuori 2002, pp. 60-61. 
46 See Tuori 2007, p. 180. 
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a tool of the party. The individual was not at the core of law, but rather the people, which partially 
explains the human rights violations under the guise of legality, which the National Socialists were 
guilty of.47 I therefore do not consider the Nazis’ concept of rule of law to be part of the German 
Rechtsstaat concept.  
 
After the Second World War, the German Rechtsstaat concept has developed toward emphasizing 
equality and democracy. One manifestation of this is Habermas’s argument that the rule of law is 
possible only as a democratic rule of law.48 After the war, the Rechtsstaat concept has become a 
concept that emphasizes social fundamental rights rather than a liberal concept that emphasizes 
individual freedoms. In addition, it has developed more into a substantive than formal principle, 
according to Fernandez Esteban.49 The legitimacy of modern law can be founded on the process 
according to which legislative amendments are implemented. In summary, in accordance with 
modern German legal thought, legislative procedure is regulated in the constitution, power 
belongs to the people and fundamental and human rights are adhered to in the rule of law. An 
active civil society, which is able to control the exercise of power by the state, functions in a 
modern rule of law state. 
 
1.4 Rule of law and the constitutional state 
 
The Anglo-American concept of rule of law was also previously fairly formal and legal positivist 
with regard to its content.50 For example for Dicey, the concept of rule of law meant that 
legislation was given undisputed priority compared to the discretion of the authorities. He also 
found that in Great Britain, the unwritten Constitution is a result of the rights of private legal 
entities, which are typically various rights to freedom and whose realization is ensured by courts 
and whose content they also define with their interpretations in a way characteristic of a common 
law legal system.51 Dicey's concept of rule of law included the requirement of equality in relation 
to legislation, which results in the fact that like private individuals, officials also are under the 
                                                     
47 See more specifically Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Susanna: Oikeuden rajoilla, Forum Iuris, 2014, pp. 33-37, (Lindroos-
Hovinheimo 2014). 
48 See Tuori 2002, p. 63. 
49 See Fernandez Esteban 1999, p. 86. 
50 See Raitio 2003, pp. 134-139 ja Tuori 2007, pp. 221-229. 
51 On the classic or traditional English concept of rule of law see Dicey, A.V.: Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution, Tenth edition, London: Macmillan, 1959, pp. 183-205, (Dicey 1959). 
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jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Indeed, the blurring of the difference between private and public 
law and preventing administrative arbitrariness is central to Dicey’s concept of rule of law.52 Tuori 
has aptly pointed out that unlike France, England had no administrative courts, and how Dicey saw 
that the French administrative court (droit administratif) was in conflict with the English concept 
of rule of law.53  
 
Like Dicey, Raz had a fairly formal understanding of the rule of law. For him, the concept of rule of 
law was above all related to the principle of legality to law in such a way that legal entities had to 
adhere to the law and they were to be governed legally.54 Raz has summarized the factors of the 
concept of rule of law as follows:  
 
1. All laws must be able to be interpreted clearly, created through open procedures and focus 
their impact on the future. 
2. Laws must be relatively stable. 
3. The adoption of special laws must comply with open, clear, established and general 
procedural rules.  
4. The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. 
5. Realization of the principles of natural justice must be guaranteed. 
6. Courts must have the power to assess the implementation of principles. 
7. Initiation of proceedings in courts should be easy. 
8. The discretion of the police and other authorities preventing crimes should not lead to 
unlawful interpretations of the law.55 
 
It would thus seem that a certain material element is related to Raz’s concept of the rule of law 
through principles of natural justice. The interpretation may be contentious, because Tuori, for his 
part, has found that Raz wants to keep, for example, the requirement of the respect for 
                                                     
52 See MacCormick, D. Neil: Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 44 (MacCormick 1999). 
53 See Tuori 2007, p. 227. 
54 See Raz, Joseph: The Authority of Law, Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 212, (Raz 
1979).  
55 ibid., pp. 214-219. 
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fundamental and human rights separate from the content of the concept of  rule of law.56 
Likewise, Paunio has described how Raz has further developed a formal line of interpretation by 
warning, somewhat like Frändberg57 and Tuori,58 against including in the concept of rule of law a 
wide range of values, principles or goals that are characteristic of a good legal system.59 Since 
then, also Craig has adopted a fairly formal concept of rule of law. According to him, the concept 
of rule of law is related not only to those procedures with which laws are brought into force but 
also the clarity of the laws and their being temporally bound.60  
 
Brownlie's analysis of the content of the concept of rule of law that was still published at the turn 
of the century was also fairly formal. He has included as the characteristics of the rule of law the 
duty of authorities and legal entities to comply strictly with the law, traditional Enlightenment 
separation of powers between the legislator, courts and executive power, independence of courts 
and equality of all legal entities with regard to the law. What stands out is that Brownlie seems to 
emphasize the equality of legal entities far more than fundamental and human rights, for 
example. For Brownlie, the constitutional exercise of power limits the powers of the government, 
or on a wider level, the powers of the executive power, in relation to the rights to freedom of 
private actors, which exemplifies an emphasis on a free market economy typical of the British 
society.61 
 
Even though the formal concept of rule of law still has its supporters, Dicey's classic concept of 
rule of law is nevertheless already dated.62 Legislation, and at the same time the competence of 
courts, are different today than during his time. For example, Hood Phillips already in the 1970s 
                                                     
56 See Tuori 2007, p. 225, where he states: “Rule of law’s requirements were formal for Raz: rule of law was not to be 
mixed with democracy, justice, equality, human rights or respecting human dignity”, on which see Raz 1979, p. 211. 
57 See Frändberg 1996, pp. 22-23. 
58 See Tuori 2002, p. 49, Tuori 2007, p. 225 and Tuori, Kaarlo: Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension between Reason and 
Will in Law, Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, p. 211, (Tuori 2011). 
59 See Paunio, Elina: Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law, Language, Discourse and Reasoning at the European Court 
of Justice, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 54-55, (Paunio 2013) and Raz 1979, s. 211. 
60 See Craig, Paul: Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy, Public Law, 2003, pp. 92-111, (Craig 
2003). 
61 See Brownlie, Ian: The Rule of Law in International Affairs. The Hague/London/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1998, pp. 213-214, (Brownlie 1998). 
62 See Bingham, Tom: The Rule of Law, Penguin books, London, 2011, pp. 66-67, which has the following apt 
description: ”A state which savagely represses or persecutes sections of its people cannot in my view be regarded as 
observing the rule of law, even if the transport of the persecuted minority the concentration camp or the compulsory 
exposure of female children on the mountainside is the subject of detailed laws duly enacted and scrupulously 
observed”.  
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proposed that when Great Britain ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951 as 
part of the concept of rule of law, the requirement of the realization of human rights was put forth 
at the same time. What is essential in Hood Phillips’s interpretation is that he did not consider 
observing the rule of law to be a question that is limited only to an interpretation of national 
law.63 Today, courts must also take into account the national (Human Rights Act 1998), for 
observance of the rule of law to be realized.64 Brexit naturally also means a significant change in 
relation to what legislation courts in Great Britain will apply in the future. Thus, legislation that is 
currently in force and independent of Brexit seems to require that the concept of rule of law 
includes substantive law elements.  
 
Collins has already in the 1980s aptly highlighted the impact of various legal theoretical schools of 
thought on the content of the concept of Rule of law.65 Legal positivists require that the 
constitutional state strictly adhere to the law in force and emphasize the importance of a linguistic 
interpretation, i.e. one that relies on the wording of the legislation.66 On the other hand, 
researchers known as “idealists” who are primarily bound to a natural justice interpretation 
tradition perceive the rule of law to also be a principle of substantive law, which aims to ensure 
the realization of the legal protection of citizens.67  
 
Dworkin is a well-known example of researchers, who intertwine the concept of rule of law with 
substantive law content in addition to the aforementioned formal elements through rights 
belonging to individuals.68 Dworkin's legal theory gives a basis for seeing that outside a legal 
                                                     
63 See Hood Phillips, O.: Constitutional and Administrative Law, Fifth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973, p. 37, in 
which he states: ”Nevertheless, there has a been a strong movement since the War – both within the Commonwealth 
and outside – to define fundamental or human rights, and such definitions or declarations have come to form an 
important part of a new international concept of ”the rule of law”.  
64 See a more specific analysis of this, for example, Tuori 2007, pp. 244-245. The Human Rights Act regulates the 
position of the the European Convention on Human Rights in the national legal system. 
65 See Collins, Hugh: Democracy and Adjudication, in Neil MacCormick and Peter Birks (eds.), The Legal Mind, Essays 
for Tony Honoré, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 68-69. 
66 See Raz 1979, p. 217, Hart, H.L.A: The Concept of Law, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, (first 
published 1961), pp. 155-184 (Hart 1997) and Weber, Max: Economy and Law, in Günther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(eds.), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Vol. 2, Bedminister Press, New York, 1968, pp. 
656-657. 
67 See. Dworkin, Ronald: Political Judges and the Rule of Law, The British Academy, London: Oxford University Press, 
London, 1980, pp. 259-287, (Dworkin 1980) and Lyons, David: Ethics and the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984, pp. 74-78 (Lyons 1984). 
68 See Craig 2003, pp. 92-111. 
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positivist legal interpretation characteristic of, for example, H.L.A Hart69 and Kelsen70, there is also 
the possibility of a legally sound argumentation. Dworkin’s premise was that the weakness of legal 
positivism was to reject the idea that private legal entities may have rights toward the state 
already before legislation has been enacted on these rights. In this sense, Dworkin strongly 
defends individual legal protection against the state.71 The concept of rule of law including 
material elements that is characteristic of Dworkin has received some support also in continental 
European research.72  
 
1.5 The concept of rule of law in EU law 
 
Already before the principle of rule of law was separately mentioned in the EU Treaty, the 
European Court of Justice stated already in 1986 in its Les Verts judgment that the then European 
Economic Community is a community of law, because both its Member States and its institutions 
are under supervision aimed at compatibility between measures implemented by them and the 
document corresponding to the Constitution, i.e. the EU Treaty.73 The Les Verts case essentially 
involved the implementation of the requirement for an effective judicial remedy in connection 
with an action for annulment. It was held in the judgment that the decision by the European 
Parliament may be appealed despite the fact that the European Parliament was not mentioned in 
the then Article 173 EC (now Article 263 TFEU) concerning annulment. Rule of law thought is 
illustrated by the fact that all acts of the then EC institutions that produced legal effects had to be 
subject to judicial oversight.74 
 
Observing the rule of law is also a condition for being a member of the European Union. In 1993, 
the European Council clarified the conditions that countries seeking EU membership must fulfill. In 
                                                     
69 See Hart 1997, pp. 79-99. H.L.A Hart found that the law consists of valid legal norms that are in force and originated 
in the legislative process through legal procedures. 
70 See Kelsen, Hans: Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, pp. 221-222, (Kelsen 1970) and 
Kelsen, Hans: Reine Rechtslehre, Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1960, p. 228, (Kelsen 1960). In Kelsen’s legal 
theory, legal norms must be separated from moral or religious norms, because the validity of a legal norm may be 
derived from another superior norm.  
71 See Dworkin, Ronald: Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. xi and xiii from the 
Introduction, (Dworkin 1978). As a matter of fact, Dicey's emphasis that stresses legal protection in the concept of rule 
of law is somewhat similar. 
72 See Raitio 2003, pp. 143-144 ja Hallberg 2004, p. 15 and 70-90. 
73 See 294/83 Parti écologiste ”Les Verts” v. the European Parliament (1986) ECR 1339, para 23. 
74 See, for example, Joutsamo, Kari – Aalto, Pekka – Kaila, Heidi – Maunu, Antti: Eurooppaoikeus, Lakimiesliiton 
kustannus, Helsinki, 2000, p. 89, (Joutsamo – Aalto- Kaila-Maunu 2000) and Hallberg 2016, pp. 92-93. 
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accordance with these so-called Copenhagen criteria, all European countries that adhere to the 
principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law may apply for membership.75 Today, respecting the principle of rule of law as condition for 
membership is manifested in the Treaty, because in accordance with Article 49 TEU, a European 
state that respects and promotes values defined in Article 2 TEU can apply for membership to the 
European Union. It is characteristic of the EU legal concept of rule of law to include, as Article 2 
TEU does,76 democracy, human rights, equality and the concept of rule of law as part of the same 
entity, which is aptly described by the following quote from the Kadi case: 
 
“It is also clear from the case-law that respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness of 
Community acts (Opinion 2/94, paragraph 34) and that measures incompatible with respect for 
human rights are not acceptable in the Community”.77  
 
Therefore, there are indications in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that 
the concept of rule of law includes certain material prerequisites for legal decision-making.78  
 
In addition, there is reason to highlight the procedure of Article 7 TEU79 to oversee the integrity of 
values in accordance with Article 2 TEU from the perspective of EU law and the operating 
framework of the Commission published in 2014, with which systemic i.e. system-level threats80 
are tackled in the Member States.81  From a wider European viewpoint, the framework, for its 
part, is meant to advance the achievement of the goals of the Council of Europe and also take into 
                                                     
75 See, for example, Jääskinen, Niilo: Euroopan unioni, oikeudelliset perusteet, Talentum, Helsinki, 2007, p. 61, 
(Jääskinen 2007). 
76 Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are 
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.” 
77 See C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, EU:C:2008:461, para 284 and also correspondingly C-112/00 
Schmidberger, EU:C:2003:333, para 73. 
78 See  8/55 Fédéchar (1955) EU:C:1956:7 and cases related to the concept of rule of law concerning EU law's external 
liability 5/71 Schöppenstedt EU:C:1971:116, 59/72 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1973:86, 20/88 Roquette frères, 
EU:C:1989:221, C-152/88 Sofrimport, EU:C:1990:259 and C-282/90 Vreugdenhill, EU:C:1992:124. 
79 See, for example, T-337/03 Bartelli Gálves v. The Commission, EU:T:2004:106, which concerned the procedure of 
then Article 7 EU now Article 7 TEU.  
80 See about the concept of systemic deficiency Von Bogdandy, Armin – Ioannidis, Michael: Systemic Deficiency in the 
Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done, Common Market Law Review 51, 2014, pp. 59-96. 
81 See the Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament and Council, A new EU operating framework for 
strengthening the principle of rule of law, COM (2014) 158 final.  
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account the expertise and views of the European Commission for Democracy through Law i.e. the 
so-called Venice Commission on the principle of rule of law. In its report, the Venice Commission 
lists the following factors included in the concept of rule of law: 
 
-principle of legality, which refers to the transparency, accountability, democratic nature and 
pluralism of the legislative process 
-legal certainty 
-prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers 
-access to justice in independent and impartial courts 
-effective judicial review, which includes respect for fundamental and human rights, and 
-equality before the law.82  
 
The Commission’s operating framework and the work of the Venice Commission have not been 
unimportant, because in January 2016 the Commission began a dialogue with Poland in 
accordance with the operating framework due to problems related to the position of the 
Constitutional Court.83  
 
A fairly unambiguous interpretation can be read of the Communication concerning the operating 
framework, according to which in EU law, the rule of law is a constitutional principle formed of 
factors concerning both form and content.84 According to the Communication, this means that 
adhering to the principle of rule of law is essentially connected to the respect for democracy and 
human rights in such a way that democracy cannot exist and human rights cannot be respected if 
the principle of rule of law is not adhered to.85 It is also central to state that the trust of EU citizens 
and national authorities in the realization of the rule of law in other Member States is important, 
                                                     
82 See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Rule of Law, Adopted 
by the Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session, Venice 25-26 March 2011, Strasbourg, 4 April 2011, Study No. 
512/2009, CDL-AD (2011)003rev., para 41. 
83 See the Commission's recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, delivered on 27 July 2016, on adhering to the principle of 
rule of law in Poland, EUVL, No L 217, 12 August 2016, pp. 53-68, (C/2016/5703), which has a reference to the Venice 
Commission's definition of the principle of rule of law in section 5 of the Introduction. 
84 In support of the interpretation concerning both the formal and material dimension of the concept of rule of law 
see, for example, C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, EU:C:2002:462, paras 38 and 39 as well as C-402/05 P 
and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, EU:C:2008:461, para 316. A corresponding policy on the substantive and 
material dimension of the principle of rule of law is also included in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, on which see Stafford v. the United Kingdom, Judgement of 28 May 2002 (Application no. 46295/99), para 63. 
85 See, for example, Broekman, Jan M: The Philosophy of European Union Law, Peeters, Leuven, 1999, p. 205. 
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so that the EU can act as a “region of freedom, law and security that does not have internal 
borders”.86 This mutual trust among the Member States has also received an especially prominent 
role in Opinion 2/13 by the Court of Justice of the European Union.87  Similarly to the Court of 
Justice, with regard to the trust among the Member States, we should emphasize that all of the 
Member States comply with Union law, especially with the fundamental rights recognized in EU 
law.88 The concept of rule of law thus receives interpretive content in EU law only in connection to 
how democracy and fundamental rights are realized and how the Member States can trust each 
others’ legal systems.89  
 
As a counter-argument to this contextual and fairly broad interpretation of the concept of rule of 
law we can return to the argument, according to which the rule of law is in danger of becoming 
blurred as a concept and losing some of its expressiveness. Thus if the concept of rule of law in a 
European context can be understood in relation to fundamental and human rights and democracy, 
then what is the content of its meaning and is the consideration of a material and formal concept 
of rule of law a relevant question anymore? My interpretation is that the contextual interpretation 
of the concept of rule of law in relation to, for example, fundamental and human rights, does not 
exclude assessing what elements constitute the rule of law. As an example, I will present a case 
law related to discrimination, with which I aim to illustrate the contextuality of the concept of rule 
of law and its both formal and material dimension.  
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has stated in the Mangold case90 that the ban against 
age discrimination is a general principle of law in Member States, but on the other hand it has 
subsequently in the Römer case91 interpreted that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
                                                     
86 See COM (2014) 158 final, para 2,”Why the principle of rule of law is decisively important for the EU”. 
87 See Opinion 2/13, Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 168,191,192 and 258 
and about the concept of mutual trust recent article by Lenaerts, Koen: La Vie Après L’Avis: Exploring the Principle of 
Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust, Common Market Law Review 54, 2017, pp. 805-840. The Court of Justice of the EU held 
that the planned agreement for the EU to join the European Convention on Human Rights is not in conformity with 
Article 6(2) TFEU or Protocol No. 8 EU, because, for example, it does not prevent the danger that the principle of 
mutual trust that exists among Member States in EU law can be infringed. 
88 Ibid., para 191. 
89 See e.g. C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi, EU:C:2016:198, para. 77 about the mutual confidence between the 
Member States that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of 
fundamental rights recognized at EU level. 
90 See C-144/04 Mangold, EU:C:2005:709. 
91 See C-147/08 Römer, EU:C:2011:286. 
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not a general legal principle. Being interpreted in both cases is Directive 2000/7892 and the then 
Article 13 EC ban on discrimination, which now is manifested in Article 19 TFEU.93  This 
interpretative set-up raises the question of whether the constitutionally bound bans on 
discrimination manifested in Article 19 TFEU meant for different groups of people are realized on 
the same level. That, for its part, is connected to the observation of the rule of law. For example, 
we can ponder whether equality is realized among different citizens. Discrimination related to age 
may in principle affect us all over time, whereas discrimination based on sexual orientation will 
not, which naturally may have political significance in a democracy. If material content is wanted 
to be permitted for the concept of rule of law, in that case we may interpret that the so-called 
fundamental rights interpretation of the law, which is not dependent on how large the group 
being discriminated against is at each time, should be emphasized in the interpretation of 
different discrimination situations.  
 
The interpretation of the Römer case in relation to the Mangold case may not, however, remain 
on such a high level of abstraction that we only ponder the weight between different 
discrimination grounds of Article 19 TFEU. To wit, the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the 
EU cannot be based on only on material law, but rather the procedural or formal side of the entity 
must also be taken into account. This took place also in the Römer case, because the Court of 
Justice of the European Union had to consider whether the examined discrimination situation 
belongs to the scope of Union law, and what is the significance of the end of the Directive's 
implementation period with regard to when an individual can have recourse to rights created by 
the Directive.94 This dimension, too, connects the concept of rule of law to the example I 
presented and emphasizes its ambiguity. 
 
1.6 Conclusions on the concept of rule of law 
 
                                                     
92 See OJ, No. L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16. 
93 See also Opinion of Advocate-General Mazák in case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa, EU:C:2007:604, Para. 96. The 
Advocate-General held that Directive 2000/78/EC and Article 13 EC do not necessarily reflect the idea that all of the 
discrimination grounds mentioned in the Directive are at the same time general legal principles in EU law.  Article 19 
TFEU mentions discrimination based on gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
94 See C-147/08 Römer, EU:C:2011:286, paras 60 and 64 and Raitio, Juha: Euroopan unionin oikeus, Talentum pro, 
Helsinki, 2016, pp. 330-333.  
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When assessing the interpretations discussed above, we must, like Raz, take into account the 
momentariness of law and its links to time and place.95 Tuori, for his part, refers to Carl Schmitt, 
for whom theoretical legal concepts were strongly time-bound in such a way that they exemplify 
the conceptual perception of their own era.96 Thus the concept of rule of law has changed over 
time as the values of the society that is being examined have changed.97 The same is emphasized 
by Nieminen, according to whom the content of rule of law has gradually changed as society 
changes and cannot today be limited only to a nation-state connection.98  
 
My own interpretation recommendation for defining the concept of rule of law starts quite 
pragmatically from the fact that the Member States of the European Union are obligated to take 
into account the interpretations the concept of rule of law has received within EU law. I believe 
what is essential is that the EU legal concept of rule of law must be interpreted in close contact 
with the democracy principle and fundamental and human rights.99 To wit, the concept of rule of 
law is an inseparable part of the basic values the EU is based on.100 In this regard, one should also 
refer to a report by the so-called Venice Commission concerning the principle of rule of law101, in 
which the rule of law is strongly connected to democracy and the demand for the realization of 
human rights. It is a different matter what is understood in national courts or by authorities about 
translation versions connected to the own legal culture, examples of which include rättstatt, 
Rechtsstaat, État de droit or rule of law. Thus when in the EU the discourse concerning the rule of 
law cannot be separated from the democracy, separation of powers and legal principles and 
human rights that legitimize the legal system that create a context for the observation of rule of 
law, we can present a rhetorical question - is the concept of rule of law a rhetorical balloon after 
all?  
 
                                                     
95 On the momentarism of law see Raz, Joseph: The Concept of a Legal System, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980, pp. 34-35, where he describes momentarism as follows: ” A momentary legal system contains all the laws 
of a system valid at a certain moment. These are usually not all the laws of the system. An English law enacted in 1906 
and repealed in 1927 and an English law enacted in 1948 belong to the same legal system. Yet there is no momentary 
legal system to which both belong, because they were never valid at one and the same moment.” 
96See Tuori 2002, 49-50 and Schmitt, Carl: Politische Theologie, Zweite Auflage, Berlin, 1934, p. 59. 
97 See Siedentop, Larry: Democracy in Europe, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 2000, pp. 73-75.  
98 See Nieminen 2004, p. 107. 
99 See Article 2 TEU and for example, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, EU:C:2008:461, para 284. 
100 See Rosas, Allan – Armati, Lorna: EU Constitutional Law, An Introduction, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010, pp. 41-43. 
101 See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Rule of Law, Adopted 
by the Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session, Venice 25-26 March 2011, Strasbourg, 4 April 2011, Study No. 
512/2009, CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 
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I do not consider justified the kind of thinking according to which the concept of rule of law is so 
ambiguous and vague that it has lost its meaning in legal argumentation. Tuori describes this 
problem with an example presented by Bingham about a legal case, whose both parties appeal to 
the principle of rule of law in such a way that it barely means anything else than “Hooray for our 
side”.102 On the one hand, it is indisputable that the concept of rule of law is ambiguous, but on 
the other hand I think that a legal interpretation is always contextual in such a way that labelling 
the concept of rule of law as a rhetorical balloon is hyperbole.  
 
Tuori has also described how Schmitt “neutralized” the concept of rule of law. Schmitt did not 
want to include material content in the concept of rule of law, because “all kinds of propagandists 
like to rely on it to denounce their opponent as an enemy of the rule of law”.103 I find that this 
interpretation originally from the 1930s cannot today be used as a reason to stick to a very formal 
concept of rule of law.104  In contemporary legal literature especially in the field of EU law one can 
refer to the “thick” conception of rule of law, which contains both formal and material 
elements.105 The protection of individual rights seems to strengthen the interpretation of “thick” 
rule of law.106  
 
                                                     
102 See Tuori 2007, pp. 224-225 and Tuori 2011, pp. 210-211. 
103 See Tuori 2007, p. 177 and Schmitt, Carl: Legalität und Legitimität, 4. Auflage, unverändert Nachdruck d. 1932 
erschienenen 1. Auflage, Berlin, 1988, p. 19. Schmitt was influential in Nazi Germany and presented, for example, an 
idea of a National Socialist rule of law, which certainly encourages one to interpret the concept of rule of law in a very 
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The concept of rule of law should be perceived as both a normative and legal cultural concept. The 
principle of rule of law extends to the deep structure of the law applying the model concerning the 
levels of Tuori's critical legal positivism.107 The concept of rule of law represents as one element 
the values manifested in Article 2 TEU, which the European Union relies on. It would be difficult to 
oppose the “thick” conception of rule of law in the framework of Nordic countries today. Not only 
because of the influence of the EU law, but because of the relatively common value basis, since all 
the Nordic democracies are based on the respect of fundamental rights and on the rule of law. It is 
interesting, however, that there has been a same kind of academic debate about the material or 
substantive element in the context of legal certainty as there has been in the context of rule of law 
in Nordic countries.108 However, in some recent academic studies the substantive element of legal 
certainty seems to have been taken for granted.109 Thus the legal concepts such as the rule of law 
can indeed vary depending on the time and place and therefore contextual interpretation is to be 
promoted. 
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